Enriqueta Aragones' Research
Political
Economics
Political
Economics
is a term coined by
Roger Myerson to define the application of Economic Analysis to
political
institutions. It is devoted to the study of political institutions by
the
methods for analysis of behavior developed in Economics.
Social
and
political institutions are enduring systems of social constraint on
human
behavior. Institutional reforms are
generally advocated with the goal of improving the people's welfare in
a
society. Economic analysis has been developed to provide a
methodology to
evaluate proposals to reform institutions.
By
examining many
such models, and by
relating the theoretical analysis to empirical findings from
comparative
politics, we can gradually build a better understanding of the
significance of
different political institutions. Work in this area may ultimately have
great
practical value in finding institutional structures that can improve
the
chances for the sustenance and spread of representative democracy in
the world.
There
is not yet
much consensus about
the basic organizing paradigms and principals of political economics.
Understanding
that the choice among different forms of democracy is a matter of great
potential importance, we should learn more about how democratic
structures may
affect the conduct of politicians and the performance of the government
Most of
my research
in Political Economics
is devoted to the study of the strategic interactions among the agents
(candidates, parties, voters, …) involved in an election. The set of
topics I have
studied is the following:
1)
Negativity
Effect:
focuses on the
voters’ processing information task
when facing an election.
2)
Political
Ambiguity:
analyzes the
strategic behavior of political
candidates when deciding on the amount of
information to deliver to voters.
3)
Campaign
Rhetoric:
devoted to analyze
the role of rhetoric in electoral
campaigns using a game theoretical framework.
4)
Elections
with a Favored Candidate: based
on the
classical spatial
model assumes an exogenous asymmetry between the
candidates.
5) Participatory
Democracy:
analyzes different
democratic systems and compares
them.
6)
Participation:
discusses several
reasons to explain the elections turnout.
7)
Government
Formation: studies
the
possibilities of governing coalitions in a
multidimensional spatial model.
8)
Electoral
Issues: investigates
the
selection of issues to be debated
during the electoral campaigns.
1) Negativity Effect:
This project deals with the limitations to acquisition and processing
of
information faced by the different agents involved in an
election. The
aim of this research is to find a convincing way to model the behavior
of these
different agents. Analyzing the information available to each
type of
agent, and the use they make of it, is a most important step in this
direction. In particular, I am interested in the interplay
between
rational strategic behavior and psychological biases.
Negativity Effect and the
Emergence of Ideologies
in Journal of
Theoretical Politics (1997) 9 (2):198-210.
A
Dynamic Model of
Multiparty Competition In
this paper
we offer a generalization of the previous model for the case of
three-party
competition. The results we find for three party competition are
qualitatively the same, and I show that they can be easily generalized
to more
than three parties. This paper allows us to test the robustness
of the
previous results. Furthermore, if we assume that parties and
candidates
have different objectives, an additional result of the three-party
model shows
the formation of parties, as infinitely lived agents with a certain
ideology,
out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy
positions.
2)
Ambiguity:
Focusing
on the ambiguity of candidates during electoral campaigns, we try to
explain
how in a political model with fully rational voters, political
ambiguity can
increase the number of voters to whom a party may appeal.
Strategic
Ambiguity in Electoral
Competition,
co-authored with
Zvika Neeman. Published in Journal of Theoretical Politics
(2000) 12(2):183-204.
Ambiguity
in
Election Games, joint
with Andrew
Postlewaite. Published in Review of Economic Design (2002) 7
(3): 233-255.
We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them
to
increase the number of voters to whom they appeal. We focus our
analysis on two
points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium:
restrictions on the
beliefs that candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters'
preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium to
exist, while
the second is necessary in order to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium
when there
exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives and when the
candidates' only objective is to win the election. The intuition is
that an
ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the
hope that
their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We also show that
if
there are sufficiently many candidates, ambiguity will not be possible
in
equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance
that at
least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.
3)
Campaign Rhetoric:
Campaign statements are cheap talk, that is, fixing all actions of all
participants, no payoffs differ when messages alone are changed. We
outline
necessary ingredients of a rational actor model in which campaign
rhetoric can
matter. We analyze how rhetoric can matter in repeated election models.
We show
how candidates may (rationally) choose to maintain a reputation for
fulfilling
campaign promises. We further discuss the determinants of the set of
promises
that candidates can credibly make in equilibrium.
Political
Reputations and Campaign Promises,
joint with Thomas Palfrey and Andrew Postlewaite. Published in the Journal of the European Economic
Association, (2007)
5 (4):
846-884. We analyze
conditions under
which campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what
policy
will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election. We develop
a model
of infinitely repeated elections with complete information in which
candidates
are purely ideological. We analyze an equilibrium in which all campaign
promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates, and voters'
strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege of
their
campaign promises. We obtain that the degree to which promises are
credible in
equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's
reputation.
Information
transmission and Reputational Dynamics in Repeated Elections joint
with Thomas Palfrey and Andrew Postlewaite. We explore an equilibrium
model of information transmission in repeated elections with two
parties. The parties use strategies that trade off the long term
benefits of maintaining a reputation for trustworthiness with the short
term policy benefits of holding office. Several different equilibrium
regimes may arise endogenously, including "alternating reputations"
where one party enjoys a good reputation for several periods, and then
loses it, and then reagins it at a later point in time. This should
lead to a stochastic cycle of reputations in which parties transmit
useful information to the voters.
Campaign
Rhetoric: a
learning model, joint
with Thomas Palfrey and Andrew Postlewaite. We analyze conditions under
which a
candidate's campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over
what
policy the candidate will implement in case he wins the election. We
develop a
model of repeated elections with asymmetric information in which
candidates are
purely ideological and voters do not know the policy preferences of the
candidates. In this model voters acquire information regarding the
candidates'
policy preferences from the fact that candidates renege or fulfill
their
campaign promises.
Campaign
Rhetoric
and Endorsements in
Electoral Competition, joint
with Andrew
Postlewaite. We
analyze the strategic interaction of political parties and potential
endorsers
during an electoral campaign in order to affect the outcome of the
election. As
a result of this interaction, voters' beliefs on the preferences of the
parties
may be affected. Political campaigns can be represented by
signalling
games, and the application of the cheap talk refinement literature to
them
appears to be a helpful tool to understand the beliefs that can be
induced in
voters.
4)
Elections with a
Favored Candidate: This
is a joint project with Thomas Palfrey. We examine competition in the
standard
one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, where one
candidate
(A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voter
preferences
are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D
unless
D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance. The location of
the
median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is
commonly known
by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to
maximize
the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fail
to exist
in this model, except under special conditions about the magnitude of
the
advantage and the distribution of the median ideal point.
Mixed
Strategy Equilibrium in a Downsian
Model with a Favored Candidate in Journal
of
Economic Theory (2002) 103 (1): 131-161.
The
Effect of Candidate Quality on
Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study in American
Political Science Review (2004) 98 (1): 77-90.
Spatial
Competition Between Two
Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and
Private
Information in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions:
Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks, Ed. David Austen-Smith and
John Duggan, (2005) Berlin: Springer. We extend the previous model by
assuming that
candidates care not only about winning but also have policy
preferences. We
also assume that there is two-dimensional private information:
candidates’
ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and
winning.
We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median
voter,
the effect of candidates’ policy preferences, and the effects of
changes in the
distribution of private information on the equilibrium outcome.
Mixed
Strategy
Equilibrium in a Downsian
Model with a Favored Candidate in a Continuous Policy Space We
replicate the
previous analysis considering an infinite policy space represented by
the unit
interval .
5) Participatory Democracy: This
is a joint project with Santiago Sanchez-Pages. Participatory
Democracy is a collective decision making process that
combines
elements from both Direct and Representative Democracy. Citizens have
the power
to decide on policy and politicians assume the role of policy
implementation.
A theory of Participatory Democracy based
on the real case of Porto Alegre in the European Economic Review (2009) 53:
56-72. We
explore a formal model of Participatory Democracy inspired in the
experience of
Participatory Budgeting implemented in the Brazilian city of Porto
Alegre. Our
model builds on the research on meetings with costly participation by
Osborne,
Rosenthal, and Turner (2000). The aim of this paper is to understand
how
Participatory Democracy operates, and to study its characteristics and
implications over the behavior of citizens and politicians and over the
final
policy outcomes.
The disadvantage of winning an election. This
paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the
legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy
proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential
source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being
elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent.
We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we
characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the
incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use
the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of
mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on
electoral competition.
6) Participation: This
is a joint project with Itzhak Gilboa and Andrew Weiss.
Making
Statements and Approval Voting
forthcoming in Theory and Decision.
We
assume that
people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which
this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an
individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible
to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null)
statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts
approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of
participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.
7) Government Formation: I
analyze the process of formation of a governing coalition in a
multidimensional
spatial model.
Government
Formation in a Two Dimensional Policy Space in the International
Journal of Game Theory, (2007)
35 (2): 151-184. Given
any allocation
of parliament seats among parties, we characterize all the stable
government configurations (supported by at least a majority of the
parliament) in terms of winning coalitions and policy outcomes. We
consider a two dimensional policy space and we assume that there are
four parties that care mainly about holding office, and only
instrumentally about policy. We find that for any distribution of seats
in the parliament only two scenarios are possible: either there is a
party that is a member of almost all equilibrium coalitions (dominant
party scenario) or there is a party that is never a member of an
equilibrium coalition (dominated party scenario). We characterize the
key party for each possible scenario and we show that it is sufficient
that the key party has intense preferences over one the issues to
guarantee the formation of a stable government coalition.
The Key Party
in the Catalan Government in the Spanish Economic Review (2007) 9
(4): 249-271. This
paper
analyzes the different
compositions of the catalan governing coalitions during the current
democratic period, and offers some predictions about the coalitions
that can be expected in the future. During this period, in catalan
politics, there have been two main political issues over which the
different parties have taken positions: rightist versus leftist with
respect to economic policy, and sovereign versus centralist with
respect to the power distribution within the state. I find that for any
allocation of parliament seats there is a key party: a party that has a
clear advantage in terms of being able to decide the composition of the
governing coalition. I show the features that allow a party to become
the key party and those that affect the size of the advantage of the
key party.
An Automated
Model of Government Formation is a joint project with Pilar
Dellunde. Forthcoming in The Political Economy
of Democracy, edited by E. Aragonès, C. Beviá, H.
Llavador, N. Schofield,
published by Fundación BBVA. We
propose a
formal model of bargaining for government
formation in a parliamentary democracy that permits the analysis of the
effects of a large class of bargaining strategies on the possibility of
reaching agreements and on the policy compromise of the members of the
government coalition that forms. We also propose a complementary
algorithm that, applied to the proposed model, would allow to implement
the simulations of the interplay of different sets of strategies. The
implementation of the combination described above should shed some
light on the performance of the different strategies according to the
benefit they produce for the parties.
Bargaining for Government Formation is a joint project with Pilar Dellunde and Xavier Vilà. It aims at constructing the algorithm proposed in "An Automated Model of Government Foramtion". Using the Netlogo software we will simulate the interplay of several parties using different strategies, and evaluate the payoffs they obtain from the outcomes of the simulation. We will compare the performance of the different strategies in different setups, and conclude about the optimality of each one of the strategies characteristics. We will also allow strategies to evolve over the paying time in order to find the optimal strategy for a party when facing a given environment. Finally, we will find the overall optimal strategies of parties that use strategies that improve over time.
Social
Choice
A
derivation of the money rawlsian
solution in
Social
Choice and Welfare (1995) 12: 267-276.
Learning
Fact
Free
learning
in
the American Economic Review
(2005) 95 (5):1355-1368. This is a
joint paper with Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew
Postlewaite, and David Schmeidler. We offer an explanation of how
people may
learn without getting new factual information. We show that given a
database,
finding a small set of variables that obtain a certain value of
accuracy is
computationally hard, in the sense that this term is used in computer
science
and we discuss some of the implications of this result and of fact-free
learning in general.